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SUMMARY 
Appellant Larry Hutchings' appeal brief noted numerous violations of state and 
federal law and procedure regarding the revocation of his probation and subsequent 
incarceration by Utah's Seventh Judicial District Court. These errors included extradition 
violations (including failure to obtain a governor's warrant and hold requisite pre-
extradition hearings and failure to follow the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act); 
prosecuting Mr. Hutchings for violations of his alleged probation after he was already 
sentenced by a New York State court for the same conduct pursuant to the Interstate 
Compact relating to suspension of probation; failure to commence probation revocation 
hearings and issue orders within the time frame established by Utah law, and after Mr. 
Hutchings' probationary period expired; and the like. 
The State raises only two responses to Mr. Hutchings' brief. First, that Mr. 
Hutchings filed two post-conviction petitions, and because this appeal relates to his 
"second" petition, his claims were either already heard and ruled upon once before-
making this "second" petition superfluous- or, any arguments not included in the "first" 
petition (and hence not addressed) should have been included by Mr. Hutchings and 
weren't, and shouldn't be considered now. Second, the State claims that because Mr. 
Hutchings admitted to conduct allegedly constituting a violation of probation at the order 
to show cause hearing the trial court convened following Mr. Hutchings' extradition, the 
State argues it was appropriate for the trial court and Court of Appeals to dismiss Mr. 
Hutchings' post-conviction petition summarily and without a hearing. 
As shown below, these arguments are entirely misplaced and non-responsive to 
the arguments raised in this appeal. Specifically, Mr. Hutchings' "second" petition is 
simply a refiling—at the State's request—of his "first" petition under Rule 65C rather 
than Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Hutchings resisted the State's 
motion that he refile on grounds that the State would then argue it was a "second" 
petition. Ultimately this Court agreed with the State and ordered Mr. Hutchings to refile 
his petition under Rule 65C. The State represented "This Court should dismiss the [Rule 
65B] petition. Petitioner may then refile his petition in the district court under rule 
65Cr (emphasis added). [R. at 337]. That is precisely what occurred, though the State 
now complains about it. The State simply cannot have it both ways. It cannot get a 
ruling that Mr. Hutchings' "first" petition be dismissed under Rule 65B to allow a refiling 
under Rule 65C, and then claim his Rule 65C petition shouldn't be considered on the 
merits because it is a "second" petition. 
Furthermore, it is true that, on advice of counsel that Mr. Hutchings now claims 
was deficient, Mr. Hutchings told the trial court at an order to show cause hearing that he 
had not completed sex-offending treatment. However, that statement (which Mr. 
Hutchings claims can be proven inaccurate) was made prior to the trial court's ruling that 
the procedural errors in his case warranted the appointment of counsel and a hearing on 
his post-conviction petition. More importantly, the hearing at which it was made was 
unlawfully convened since, inter alia, a New York state court had already dismissed 
Utah's charge of probation violation that the trial court's OSC was convened for; Mr. 
Hutchings wasn't properly extradited to be present for that hearing; the hearing was held 
outside the time parameters for probation revocation hearings established by Utah Code; 
and etc. In other words, the statement Mr. Hutchings made is irrelevant because the court 
didn't have jurisdiction over Mr. Hutchings for purpose of conducting the hearing where 
his utterance occurred. 
In short, the State has not responded at all to any of the procedural and legal errors 
set forth in Mr. Hutchings' opening brief. Mr. Hutchings should be released forthwith, or 
alternatively, be given a hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief with the 
assistance of counsel for the reasons set forth in his appeal brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE HAS NOT ADDRESSED ANY ISSUE RAISED ON APPEAL 
Rather than addressing the merits of Mr. Hutchings1 arguments - which have never 
been addressed by any court - the State takes a stance that contradicts the position it took 
when it moved this Court to dismiss Mr. Hutchings' Rule 65B Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief and sought a refiling by Mr. Hutchings under Rule 65C. In that motion, Appellee 
stated that this Court should dismiss Mr. Hutchings' petition filed under Rule 65B "so 
that petitioner can file his petition in the proper court" or "transfer the petition to the 
appropriate district court for post-conviction proceedings under rule 65C." The State 
went on to say " Petitioner may then refile his petition in the district court.. ." (emphasis 
added) [R. at 3337 (attached hereto as Addendum "A")]. Opposing the motion, Mr. 
Hutchings sought to avoid the procedural box the State is trying to force him in now, and 
stated that "any such filing as the State claims in there [sic] motion could only result in a 
dismissal based on repetitive filings." [R. at 400 (attached hereto as Addendum "B")]. 
Acting on cue, the State now asks this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals' 
affirmance of the district court's summary dismissal of Mr. Hutchings' Second Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief. Appellee argues that because the issues in the second petition 
were, or could have been, raised in the first petition, summary dismissal was proper. But, 
it was the State that demanded Mr. Hutchings refile his petition under Rule 65C. The 
State simply cannot have it both ways. 
Furthermore, the State fails to recognize that Mr. Hutchings was never represented 
by counsel in conjunction with the first petition and the issues in that petition were never 
considered by the trial court - despite the fact that the trial court expressly stated that Mr. 
Hutchings needed counsel and deserved a hearing on the issues raised therein. 
Briefly stated, the State has not addressed a single procedural or legal error raised 
by Mr. Hutchings in his petition or in this appeal. His assertions, arguments and 
authorities that he was not extradited properly, that his alleged probation violations were 
dismissed by a New York Court prior to his extradition, and the like, all stand unrefuted 
before this Court. The unrefuted arguments before the court at this point include the 
following: 
i. There is no record of any Governor's warrant having 
been issued or any pre-extradition hearing having occurred 
prior to the extradition of Mr. Hutchings from New York. 
Both are prerequisites for an extradition to vest the seventh 
district court with jurisdiction over Mr. Hutchings.1 
1
 This court should note that the State sought, and was granted, an enlargement of time prior to 
filing its opposition brief so that it could obtain the complete record in the matter. It is noteworthy that in 
light of Mr. Hutchings' challenge that these items did not exist in the record, followed by the State's 
enlargement of time for leave to search the record for those items, that the State's opposition brief still is 
silent as to those issues. 
ii. Mr. Hutchings' extradition also violated the Uniform 
Criminal Extradition Act due to the fact that the state of Utah 
failed to extradite Mr. Hutchings from his detention in New 
York within thirty days of the date he was detained by New 
York and New York notified Utah of his detention. See Utah 
Code Ann. §77-30-15. 
iii. No probation revocation hearing has been properly 
noticed and convened in the state of Utah and Mr. Hutchings' 
original probation period has expired. Therefore his 
probation was not legally revoked prior to the expiration of 
his probation, divesting the trial court of any jurisdiction or 
authority to revoke his probation at this point. See e.g. 
Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972); Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-18-1; Smith v. Cook 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990). 
iv. The eighteen-month-plus delay from the issuance of 
the final warrant on February 8, 1995 for an alleged probation 
violation to the date the trial court claimed to have revoked 
his probation constituted an unreasonable delay of 
prosecuting Mr. Hutchings for an alleged probation violation, 
as the term "reasonable time" has been defined by United 
States courts. See e.g. Morrissey 408 U.S. at 488; Wells v. 
Wise 390 F. Supp. 299; United States v. Lindsey, 395 F. Supp. 
404 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (nine month delay between conviction 
and holding of revocation hearing is unreasonable delay). 
v. After being incarcerated for an alleged probation 
violation, the state of Utah violated Mr. Hutchings' 
constitutional rights by denying him the original parole 
hearing required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-7. 
vi. The state of Utah unconstitutionally subjected Mr. 
Hutchings to double-jeopardy when it tried and sentenced 
him for an alleged probation violation that a New York court 
had already heard and passed sentence upon. 
vii. The state of Utah violated the full faith and credit 
clause of the constitution when it convened a hearing and 
sentenced Mr. Hutchings for an alleged probation violation 
after a New York state court had already convened a hearing 
and delivered a sentence on the same charge. 
viii. The state of Utah failed to comply with the Interstate 
Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers 
Act when the seventh district court found Mr. Hutchings to 
have violated his probation without addressing the New York 
court's ruling dismissing the same alleged probation 
violation. 
ix. Mr. Hutchings was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel at his probation revocation hearing and his appeal of 
the order following that hearing. 
x. It was an obvious abusive discretion and reversible 
error for the district court to dismiss Mr. Hutchings' petition 
as frivolous on its face when it stated so many viable legal 
and procedural errors relating to his incarceration and 
substitive grounds for a lack of jurisdiction by the district 
court. 
xi. It was an abusive discretion and reversible error for the 
trial court to dismiss as patently frivolous on its face Mr. 
Hutchings' petition without stating any rational or reasoning 
when the same district court had previously found on the 
record that the same petition warranted a hearing and 
appointment of counsel. 
xii. The Court of Appeals alleged its discretion and erred 
as a matter of law when it upheld the trial court's summary 
dismissal of Mr. Hutchings' petition in light of these legal and 
procedural errors. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS AND 
IMMEDIATELY FREE MR. HUTCHINGS FROM INCARCERATION, 
OR, AT A MINIMUM, GIVE HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WITH 
ASSISTANCE OF COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL 
Mr. Hutchings agrees with the State that the decision before this Court is whether 
to reverse or affirm the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's summary 
dismissal of the Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Mr. Hutchings also agrees 
that, normally, if this Court reverses the Court of Appeals, the remedy would be to 
remand the case to the trial court. Nevertheless, as this Court has also stated, "a remand 
is not necessary if the evidence in the record is undisputed and the appellate court can 
fairly and properly resolve the case on the record before it." Flying Diamond Oil Corp. 
v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 1989). 
The record is undisputedly clear, and Mr. Hutchings5 arguments unrefuted, that the 
trial court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing the "second" petition. As 
discussed in Mr. Hutchings' opening brief, the record reflects that the State of Utah (1) 
violated Mr. Hutchings5 rights under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act by 
incarcerating him for over thirty days and failing to hold a pretrial hearing; (2) deprived 
Mr. Hutchings of his statutory and due process rights by failing to provide him with 
timely and complete notice of the charges against him and his due process rights at the 
probation revocation hearings; (3) unreasonably delayed in extraditing Mr. Hutchings by 
failing to hold a revocation hearing until eighteen months after the alleged probation 
violation took place; (4) violated (a) the Full Faith and Credit Clause and (b) Mr. 
Hutchings5 constitutional right to protection from double jeopardy when it subjected Mr. 
Hutchings to a hearing and passed sentence on him for allegedly violating the terms of 
his probation after a New York State court had already dismissed the same alleged 
probation violation charges; and (5) failed to comply with its statutory obligations under 
the Interstate Compact for Supervision of Parolees or Probationers by extraditing Mr. 
Hutchings and revoking his probation based on the same charges that the New York state 
court had dismissed. Mr. Hutchings5 petition also established that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing and in perfecting his 
appeal. It cannot be lost on this court that none of these legal and procedural defects are 
challenged or even addressed by the State in its brief. 
Because the issues raised in Mr. Hutchings' first brief establish, as a matter of law, 
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convene a probation revocation hearing, this 
Court would be fully justified in immediately releasing Mr. Hutchings from incarceration 
based on the aforementioned and unrefuted errors. Nowhere is it mandated that this 
Court remand the case to the trial court for a hearing when this Court can decide the legal 
issues based on the undisputed record. Flying Diamond Oil, 776 P.2d at 622. 
Nevertheless, the Court should at least remand the case to allow Mr. Hutchings the 
hearing he never received on these important issues, with proper appointed counsel. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DISMISSED 
MR. HUTCHINGS' SECOND PETITION AND THE COURT OF 
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DECISION. 
The crux of Appellees' argument is that because the issues in the second petition 
were previously raised and addressed, or could have been raised, in the first petition, the 
district court properly summarily dismissed the second petition. Indeed, Appellee's brief 
paints a picture showing that Mr. Hutchings' "first" petition was properly heard, decided, 
There is no dispute, nor can there be, that the record contains no Governor's 
warrant for extradition; no record of a pre-extradition hearing; contains a transcript of the 
New York court dismissing Utah's claim of probation violation upon payment of a small 
fine; and the like. In other words, not only are the legal effects of these facts unrefuted 
by the State, but the procedural record is also unrefuted and unrefutable. 
and dismissed. The picture, however, has a crucial flaw: the issues raised in the first 
petition were never heard or decided and therefore the dismissal was improper. 
Before a hearing on Mr. Hutchings' "first" petition, the Prosecutor's office sent 
Mr. Hutchings a letter asking him to prepare a draft of his petition for the hearing. 
[Exhibit II-E to Mr. Hutchings5 writ]. Mr. Hutchings prepared a hand-written draft of his 
petition and submitted it to the Court and to the prosecutor at the January 22, 1997 
hearing. After a brief review of the petition, the trial court stated that it could not 
establish the factual matters at issue and that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary. 
The court also stated that Mr. Hutchings was entitled to appointed counsel. The 
discussion then turned to who would pay for the appointed counsel and the hearing 
concluded with the court requiring the State to advise it on that issue. 
By July, 1997, after an additional six months in jail, Mr. Hutchings moved for an 
order to show cause why counsel had not been appointed. Unexpectedly, the trial court 
denied the first petition as frivolous - failing to address the specific points raised in that 
petition.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed. After Mr. Hutchings petitioned for rehearing 
and was denied, he petitioned this Court for a writ of extraordinary relief. 
In moving to dismiss the petition for extraordinary relief, the state of Utah argued 
that it should be governed by Utah R. of Civ. 65C (Post-Conviction Relief) - stating that 
"the Court should dismiss the petition so that petitioner can file his petition in the proper 
3
 It is important to note that Mr. Hutchings5 handwritten Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief would have been clarified and better drafted if he would have received 
the assistance of counsel that the court already noted he deserved. 
court." Mr. Hutchings opposed that motion and argued that if the petition were remanded 
to the trial court, it would be summarily dismissed for repetitive filings. The State now 
makes that very argument - asserting that the petition should be dismissed because it is 
repetitive. 
This Court surely did not remand Mr. Hutchings' petition simply to watch the trial 
court summarily dismiss without providing Mr. Hutchings court-appointed counsel or an 
opportunity to be heard. If that were the intended result, this Court would have simply 
denied the petition as frivolous on its face as a matter of law without need of remanding 
the petition to the district court. Mr. Hutchings agrees that nearly all of the issues 
contained in the first petition are found in the second. Those issues have never been 
addressed and Mr. Hutchings has never received a hearing on them, even though the trial 
court found that one was necessary. Indeed, the "first" and "second" petitions should be 
considered one and the same for purposes of this appeal. This Court should decide the 
legal issues presented in them or at least ensure that Mr. Hutchings is afforded the 
counsel and hearing on them that he deserves, but has never had. 
As discussed above, this Court is not required to send this matter down to the trial 
court for a hearing. The record reflects, as a matter of law, that Mr. Hutchings is entitled 
to immediate release. It remains unrefuted in the record that the state of New York 
previously sentenced Mr. Hutchings on Utah's alleged probation violations before the 
Utah court re-heard the same claim. Mr. Hutchings' other arguments of how the court 
had no jurisdiction or authority over him at the OSC hearing also remain unrefuted by the 
State. If not immediately released, the Court should, at a minimum, require the trial court 
to hear and decide Mr. Hutchings' arguments on their merits and not summarily dismiss 
as them as frivolous without giving them any consideration. 
MR, HUTCHINGS' IN-COURT STATEMENT CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR 
PROBATION REVOCATION 
The only other argument that the State makes to justify the Court of Appeals is 
that Mr. Hutchings admitted that he failed to complete sex-offender treatment or to timely 
contact his probation officer at the order to show cause hearing. Thus, the State 
concludes no hearing on Mr. Hutchings' post-conviction petition was needed.5 
Unfortunately, that argument is too simplistic. Because Mr. Hutchings was not extradited 
properly, he shouldn't have been before the court to make those statements. Since the 
New York court, which had jurisdiction over Mr. Hutchings and his probation review 
pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Supervision of Probationers, dismissed the Utah 
warrant for allegedly violating the terms of his probation, then the Utah court held Mr. 
4
 For instance, where the record includes a transcript from the New York court 
passing sentence on the alleged probation violation that Utah later prosecuted Mr. 
Hutchings for, his argument that he was in double-jeopardy surely was not patently 
frivolous. This also holds for claims of improper extradition, and the like. Importantly, 
the State has not even attempted to explain how the trial court - or the Court of Appeals -
could have reasonably concluded the petition was frivolous on its face in light of such 
gross procedural errors and missing procedural records. It is patently not frivolous to 
point to a record of the New York court and claim the charge had already been 
prosecuted. It was patently not frivolous to demonstrate that he had been held longer 
than allowed by law without a revocation hearing before Utah even attempted 
(improperly at that) to extradite him. No analysis to the contrary is even offered by the 
State in its opposition brief 
5
 The Court should note that Mr. Hutchings contends that he has completed sex-
offenders treatment and complied with all probation registration requirements. 
Hutchings in double-jeopardy when it prosecuted him on the same charge the New York 
court already passed sentence upon. Because the Utah trial court did not act to revoke 
probation until after the probationary period expired, the hearing at which these 
statements were made was wrongfully held, and hence they cannot be the proper basis for 
Mr. Hutchings' current incarceration. 
These, and the other issues raised on Mr. Hutchings5 appeal, have never been 
addressed by any court. The trial court simply dismissed the petition which raised these 
arguments (albeit inartfully) as frivolous. After playing bait-and-switch, getting Mr. 
Hutchings' first petition dismissed to make way for a refiling under Rule 65C, the State 
would now have this Court also dodge the serious issues of federally mandated 
proceedings and protection that Mr. Hutchings has never received, but demanded from 
the beginning of his incarceration, yet never had addressed by any court. 
Mr. Hutchings need not restate the numerous cases set forth in his opening brief, 
which were not even addressed by the State, which hold that when a state fails to comply 
with procedural requirements to convene a probation revocation hearing, or to extradite a 
prisoner, it has no jurisdiction over him, and hence, any subsequent rulings are null and 
void ab initio. E.g. State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). (A trial 
court retains jurisdiction over a probationer after the original probation period expires on 
its face only if revocation procedures are "properly initiated before the probation period 
expires.") Id- (emphasis added). Accord Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 443, 443 (1981) 
(court obtains jurisdiction over prisoner extradited form foreign jurisdiction after, inter 
alia, pre-extradition hearing is held.) 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' 
affirmance of the district court's summary dismissal of Appellant's Second Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief The issues in Mr. Hutchings' petitions were never addressed and 
the record before this Court clearly establishes that the State of Utah failed to initiate 
probation revocation proceedings in a timely fashion; failed to comply with the Interstate 
Compact regarding New York's decision to release Mr. Hutchings after two hearings at 
which no evidence was adduced to show he had violated the terms of his probation; failed 
to afford Mr. Hutchings his statutory and constitutional due process rights at the 
probation revocation hearings; and failed to comply with prerequisites necessary to 
extradite Mr. Hutchings to this state. Accordingly, the trial court was without jurisdiction 
to revoke Mr. Hutchings1 probation. That order should be reversed and Mr. Hutchings 
should be immediately freed from incarceration. At a minimum, the Court of Appeals 
should be reversed, the matter remanded, and Mr. Hutchings allowed to present evidence 
of his contentions at an evidentiary hearing with the assistance of court-appointed 
counsel. 
DATED: November/- f,2002 n 
Respectfully submitted, 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Dc'Matthew Moscon 
Marc T. Rasich 
Justin B. Palmer 
David J. Williams 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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MEMORANDUM 
THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THE PETITION BECAUSE 
IT IS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WHICH IS 
GOVERNED BY RULE 65C, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE; UNDER THAT RULE, THE PETITION MUST 
BE FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Petitioner files an original petition for extraordinary relief in this Court. His petition, 
however, appears to attack the validity of his 1992 guilty pleas to aggravated sexual abuse 
of a child, a first degree felony, and sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony. The 
petition also appears to contest the district court's order revoking his probation. Thus, 
although petitioner styles his petition as one for extraordinary relief under rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in substance his petition is really for post-conviction relief under 
rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 65B permits a petitioner to seek extraordinary relief "[w]here no other plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy is available/' Here, petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy under rule 65C. Rule 65C governs proceedings "in all petitions for post-conviction 
relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et. seq. Post-Conviction Remedies Act." 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 65C(a). Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (1995) permits a person convicted 
and sentenced for a criminal offense to "file an action in the district court of original 
jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence." Rule 
2 
376 
65C places venue for actions filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in the district 
court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
65C(b). Copies of Rules 65B and 65C and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act are attached. 
Because petitioner's claims clearly fall within the provisions of the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act and rule 65C, this Court should dismiss the petition. Petitioner may then refile 
his petition in the district court under rule 65C. Alternatively, this Court should transfer the 
petition to the appropriate district court for proceedings consistent with the provisions of rule 
65C.1 
CONCLUSION 
Because the petition is in substance a rule 65C petition for post-conviction relief, it 
must be filed in the district court. This Court should therefore dismiss the petition so that 
petitioner can file his petition in the proper court. Alternatively, the Court should transfer 
Petitioner claims that it would be inappropriate for him to file his petition in the 
district court because it and the court of appeals are prejudiced against him as 
evidenced by prior adverse rulings. The fact that petitioner may have received prior 
adverse rulings from the district court and court of appeals, however, is not a basis for 
showing that the lower courts are unfairly prejudiced against him. Under the 
circumstances, the appropriate procedure is for petitioner to file his petition in the 
district court and to appeal any adverse ruling. 
3 
377 
the petition to the appropriate district court for post-conviction proceedings under rule 65C, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this | 7 ^ day of fJwewAe*., 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
<E#0U / > Z^Wfc^ 
OJRA B. DUPAIX' 
'Assistant Attorney General 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the/j£ 3ay of November, 1999, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion and Supporting Memorandum to Dismiss or Transfer Petition was mailed 
postage prepaid to the following: 
Larry L. Hutchings, #25435 
Petitioner Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on 
any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on 
personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or 
corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial 
authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole). There shall be no special form of writ. Except for 
instances governed by Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern 
proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. Tb the extent that this rule 
does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary 
relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall 
govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of 
personal liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this 
paragraph. 
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition 
with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained 
or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a 
short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks 
relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place where the person is 
restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by the 
petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief 
in the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal 
process available to the petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner 
shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner 
in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument 
or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in 
a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent 
to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in 
a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall 
appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing 
die claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for this 
conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The 
order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall 
terminate with the entry of *he order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings, if the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous 
on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the 
petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the 
same time, the court may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or 
otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within which the respon-
dent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an 
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the 
legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plaii.ly whether the 
respondent has restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether 
the person so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, 
the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or 
authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive 
motion. 
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(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained 
will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury 
before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue 
a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be 
dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court 
may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such 
other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative service pf the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be 
found, or if it appears that a person other than the .respondent has custody of 
the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any other process 
issued by the court may be served on the person having custody in the manner 
and with the same effect as if that person had been named as respondent in the 
action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent If anyone having custody of the 
person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts 
wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall 
immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith bring 
the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a 
hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render 
judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall 
appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons for 
failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring 
before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right 
to be present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order 
accordingly. The hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or 
any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the 
meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent, 
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and 
when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the 
grounds enumerated in this paragraph. Any person who is not required to be 
represented by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one 
of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may petition the 
court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office 
unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition 
under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition 
filed by a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by 
an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for costs and 
damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The 
sureties shall be in the form for bonds on ^rpeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person 
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether 
civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the 
authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or permits any act 
that results in-a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a corporation 
in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where any 
corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, 
alteration or renewal of corporations: or (E) where any corporation has 
forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or franchises. 
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(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, 
or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the 
hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions 
by board of pardons and parole. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened 
by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for 
relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions 
has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior 
court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act 
required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use 
or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where 
the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to 
perform an act required by constitutional or statutory law. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, 
or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the 
hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative 
agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to 
the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also 
grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, 
the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993; July 1, 1996.) 
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Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief* 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-
conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-
Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing 
a petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the 
judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms 
provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion 
if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of 
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the 
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not 
be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition 
shall state: 
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarcera-
tion; 
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and 
sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, 
together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the 
petitioner; 
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the 
petitioner's claim to relief; 
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for 
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and 
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of 
the appeal; 
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated 
in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case 
number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the 
results of the prior proceeding; and 
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered 
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time 
for the cfeim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous 
post-conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner 
shall attach to tht petition: 
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allega-
tions; 
(2) -a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court 
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction 
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or 
sentence; and ' 
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument 
or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in 
a separate memorandum two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
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,f) Assignment On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign 
sd deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who 
sctenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the 
yrmal course. 
ig)(l) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hall review the 
jrtition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated 
- a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its 
i t , the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating 
r-iher ^ t the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its 
£e. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim 
.sail terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal 
seed not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
i2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations 
attained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
• A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
iB) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
iC) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired 
pnor to the filing of the petition. 
i3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading 
error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall 
return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court 
aay grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown. 
i4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-
conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that 
ail or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall 
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the 
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail 
upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or 
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney 
General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that 
prosecuted the petitioner. 
li) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these 
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the 
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the 
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
thai have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time 
allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the 
motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered 
by the court. 
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the 
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also 
order a prehearing conference, b'* the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing 
conference, the court may: 
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to 
be presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at 
the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The 
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephene or video 
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court dunng the 
proceeding. The court may conducr any hearing at the correctional facility 
*here the petitioner is confined. 
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(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed 
by the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good 
cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence 
that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order 
either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or 
court records. 
(m) Orders; stay. 
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the 
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be 
stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written 
notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new 
trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the 
stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will 
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the 
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or 
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to 
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that 
may be necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under 
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, 
the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that 
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department 
of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and sections 21-7-3 through 21-7-4.7 govern 
the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the 
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be 
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of 
Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
(Added effective July 1, 1996.) 
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78.35a-101. Short title. 
This act shall be known as the Tost-Conviction Remedies Act* 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-101, enacted by Effective Dates, - Laws 1996, cfa. 235 
L1996, en* 235, 5 1. became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
Compiler1! Notes. — As enacted, this chap- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25. 
ret did not contain a Part 2. 
78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies. 
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who 
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has 
exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as 
provided in Subsection (2). Procedural provisions for filing and commencement 
of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rides of Civil Procedure. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or 
sentence for a criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-102, enacted by became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L 1996, ch. 235, } 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-103- Applicability - Effect on petitions. 
Except for the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107, this 
chapter applies only to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1, 
1996. 
History: C, 1953, 78-35a-103, enacted by betaume effective on Apr I 29, 1996, pursuant to 
L 1996, ch. 235, } 3. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Date*. — Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-104. Grounds for relief — Retroactivity of rule. 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has 
been convicted and-sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the 
district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the Mowing grounds: 
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(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation 
of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which 
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was 
revoked in an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the 
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction 
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that 
was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could 
have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the 
sentence received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or 
Utah Court of Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be 
governed by applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-104, enacted by became effective on Anril 29,1996, pursuant to 
L. 1996, ch- 235, $ 4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-105. Burden of proof. 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The 
respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to 
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
History. C 1953, 78-35a-105, enacted by became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
L. 1996, en- 235, 8 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-106. Preclusion of relief — Exception. 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground 
that: 
'(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
600 
38? 
POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 78«35a-107 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request-for 
post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (IXc), a person may be eligible for relief on 
a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-106, enacted by became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L 1996, ch- 235, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction re-
lief. 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year 
after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of 
the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment 
of conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction 
over the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah 
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ 
of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the 
entry of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for 
writ of certiorari is filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition 
is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse 
a petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations. 
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period 
established in this section. 
History: C. 1953,78-12-31.1, enacted by L. 31.1; added Subsection (4), redesignating 
1995, ch- 82, § 1; renumbered by L. 1996, former Subsection (4) as (3); deleted former 
ch. 235, J 7. Subsections (3) and (5) concerning applicability 
Repeals and Reenactznents. — Laws to time limitations and motions to correct a 
1995, ch. 82, § 1 repeals former § 78-12-31.1, as sentence; in Subsections (1) and. (2) deleted 
enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 133, § 1, setting a "pursuant to Rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
three-month time limit on the right to petition Procedure* after "entitled to relief; and in 
fcr a habeas corpus writ, and enacts the present Subsection (2) deleted "in a petition for post-
•ection, effective May 1, 1995. conviction reiier after "cause of action." 
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amend- Cross-References. - Extraordinary relief. 
ment, effective April 29,1996, renumbered this j ^ ^ g~g UJLC.P 
•ection, which formerly appeared as § 78-12- * 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Constitutionality of former section. 
r K'lfHr *^c t^ree*mont^x limitation period formerly 
Appiicabiiity. contained in this section was an unreasonable 
Constitutionality of former section. limitation on the constitutional right to petition 
Applicability. f°r a habeas corpus writ; it violated petitioners1 
Petitions for writs of certiorari and xnanda- rights under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 11 to seek 
mus were not subject to the statute of limita- a civil remedy in state courts. Currier v. 
tions that was intended to govern petitions for Holden, 862 R2d 1357 (Utah Ct App. 1993), 
writs of habeas corpus. Renn v. Utah State Bd. cert, denied, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994) (decided 
of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995) (decided under former section), 
under former section). 
78-35a-108. Effect of granting relief — Notice. 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either. 
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or 
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or 
sentencing proceeding as appropriate. 
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be 
stayed for five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give 
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will 
pursue a new trial or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no 
action. 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time 
during the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift 
the stay and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner. 
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence 
the petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to 
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters 
that may be necessary. 
History: C. 1953, 7&-35a-108, enacted by became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L. 1996, ch. 235, § 8. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel* 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, 
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. 
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not 
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the 
following factors: 
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require 
an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that 
require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective 
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition. 
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History: C. 196% 7&-35a-109, enacted by became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L1996, ch, 235, i •• Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-110. Appeal — Jurisdiction. 
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for 
post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3. 
History: C. 1953, 7S-35a-110, enacted by became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
L1996, ch. 235, { 10. Utah Const., Art VI, Sec 25. 
Effective Date*. - Laws 1996, ch. 235 
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51 a t e • s f n o t i o n t o d i s rn i s s „ o r t r a. n s f e r t o t h e d I s t r i e t e o u r t. , T 
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Memor andurn 
The D e f e n d a n t i n t h e S t a t e o f U t a h A r g u e s t h a t P e t i t i o n e r s 
Pet i t i o r i 1 e f o r Pos t . - Con\/ i c t i on Re 11 e f a n d t o be gover neci by r u. 1 •• 
65C , Ut ah r u 1 es o f c i v i 1 p r o c e d u r e t h e P e t i t i o n e r wou 1 d c a l l t h e 
Courts attention to the following Appendix's to the petition for 
Extordlnary Writ II-E, II-F, II-G and II-H in Appendix volume I 
Pages 134 through 151 and subsequently Appendix's II~I , II™ J, II-
K, II-l, II-M* II-N, and II.-0 these appendix's refer to a 
Pet itiori f or Post-Conviction Relief to the Distr ict court in t.he 
matters now before this court. Further the petitioner calls the 
Courts attention to Appendix's II-P, II~Q„ II-R>II«S> II-T, II~U, 
II~V, II-X, II-Y, II Z, III-A and III-B is further the subsequent. 
appeal of the final Order of the District Court on petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief to the Utah Court of Appeals the 
Petitioner would remind the court that as set forth in section 
78-35a~106 (l) (d) titled "Preclusion of Relief - Exception" "was 
I u r t h e r in S e c 1x o n 7; 
limitations: for Post 
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entry of the decisio 
j u r i s d i o 1i o n o v e T t.! i 
taken place r ef e* I c 
f or Ex tvaor d 1 na i y UJr 
Pet iti onei . 
urther any such fi 
our. r equest 
J. u, 
Post-Com 
>r t 
on Relief 
:o nv i c t. 1 o n Re 1 i ef " a pe11t1 o ne \ 1 s e nt i 11 ed 
petition is filed within one year of the 
of the Appe 11 a 111. c ou.r t w h 1 c hi i ias 
c a s c 11 a p p e a x i s f a K e ri a s i n t. hi x s c a s •. h a s 
h< af or e111e nt i ened Appendi >• ' s i.o pe1111 ovi 
subsequent this 1 IT! the 
a s 1; 
on J. >- r ecu 
bases for 
supported 
code Ann. 
is i n t he i e mot i on 
repel: i tive f i ii nas 
1: ["i e p e t i t. I o n e i s c I a i m o f p r e j u d i c e I s a c t u a. 1 and 
bv the aforementioned statutes of law under the Utah 
Afti) 
In Conclusion 
As Post--Conviction Relief has been Sought on the issues to the-
district court and the subsequent or ders ha.vi ng been appealed to 
the Utah court of Appeals it is by aforementioned 'Statutes of 
it would be further denial of the petitioner 's Constitutional 
Rights under the fifth, s i x t h a n d t h e f o u r teen t h a m e r 1 d rn e 111 s t o 
the constitution of these United States for this court not to 
review and rule on the petitioners petition for Extraordinary 
Writ. 
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